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A common feature of the Torrens system is an assurance fund to 
guarantee title against loss. The principles of "indefeasibility" and "guar- 
antee" are complimentary: the former gives security against deprivation; 
the latter assumes the possibility of such deprivation and grants financial 
assistance if it occurs. Torrens commented on the theoretical basis for the 
inclusion of compensation provisions in the 1857 Act:' 
... as we cannot give the land to one and the improvements to another, there is no way of 
avoiding injustice other than that adopted in the South Australian Act, giving compensation 
in money to the rightful proprietor ... indefeasibility of title is a necessary corollary to the 
[abolition of the respective investigation of titles], and from this again follows the necessity 
of providing a fund whence compensation in money may be secured to the rightful heirs 
and others who through the operation of the law may be barred Erom recovering the land 
itself ... 
In New Zealand, the Land Transfer Act 1952 provides compensation 
not only for deprivation of an estate or interest in land, but also for loss or 
damage caused by mistakes on the part of the Registrar or his or her 
officers. This expansion of Torrens' original intention is currently the 
subject of judicial debate. The first part of this paper examines two recent 
New Zealand judgments which grapple with the undefined parameters of 
loss other than "land loss". In the second part, questions are raised as to 
the lack of litigation in cases where an innocent party has suffered some 
form of land deprivation. 
The fundamental provision for compensation in the Land Transfer Act 
1952 is set out below: 
172. Compensation for mistake or misfeasance of Registrar - 
Any person - 
(a)Who sustains loss or damage through any omission, mistake, or misfeasance of any 
Registrar, or of any of his officers or clerks, in the execution of their respective duties; 
or 
(b)Who is deprived of any land, or of any estate or interest in land, through the bringing of 
the land under the Land Transfer Acts, or by the registration of any other person as 
proprietor of that land, or by any error, omission, or misdescription in any certificate of 
title, or in any entry or memorial in the register, or has sustained any loss or damage by 
the wrongful inclusion of land in any certificate as aforesaid, and who by this is barred 
from bringing an action for possession or other action for the recovery of land, estate 
~ - 
or interest - 
may bring an action against the Crown for recovery of damages. 
1 Torrens, The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title (1859). 
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Procedural provisions in this Part of the Act comprise the measure of 
damages, the limitation of actions, notice before action, costs and the 
Crown's right of s~brogation.~ Exceptions to the Crown's liability to pay 
compensation are embodied in s. 178 of the Land Transfer Act 1952. In 
1984, the introduction of s. 172A made available compensation for loss 
occurring after a search of a title but before registration. The guaranteed 
search scheme is now well established. Its protection is limited - it gives 
to any purchaser a guarantee against adverse entries in the Land Transfer 
journal, but does not provide a guarantee of priority over competing 
interests. 
THE SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS: S. 172(a) 
For many years, the parameters of s. 172 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 
have remained un~ontested.~ 
However, in 1995, two cases gave the Courts the opportunity to revisit 
some established principles. Both cases involved claims coming within s. 
172(a), and both were successful. Each judgment raises important issues. 
1: Registrar-General ofLand v ~ a r s h a l f  
The Facts: 
In 19 15 Henare Maiho was gifted land in the Tuakau area. The land was 
the subject of a Maori Land Partition Order made in 19 15. The order was 
registered in the Land Transfer Office in 19 17 and later that year a title 
was issued in Mr Maiho's name. Part of the land was transferred in 1926 
and in the same year a small amount was taken for road. 
In 1938 Mr Maiho transferred the land he owned to his children. The 
transfer was recorded in the Maori Land Court Registry but not in the Land 
Transfer Office. Mr Maiho died intestate in 1948 but his estate was not 
administered until 1974. In the administration of the estate there was a 
failure to produce the transmission and subsequent transfer to the Maori 
Land Court. The result of several transactions was that the Land Transfer 
Office and the Maori Land Court had different people recorded as owners: 
the Land Transfer title showed a Mr Marshall (the purchaser from the 
estate) as the owner whereas the Maori Land Court showed the children as 
owners. In 1986 Marshall was refused a loan from the Department of Maori 
Affairs because the latter was unhappy with the title position. 
Marshall took proceedings in the Maori Land Court and an order was 
made declaring him the owner of the land. Marshall then claimed the costs 
of those proceedings - $10,064.71 - against the State on the ground they 
were a loss through an omission or mistake by the Registrar under s. 172(a) 
of the Land Transfer Act 1952. 
2 Sections 179, 180, 173, 174, 175-7 Land Transfer Act 1952. 
3 Early twentieth century cases helped clarify both the breadth and the limitations of the section. 
See, for example, Wells v Registrar-General of Lands (1909) 29 NZLR 101; Dempster v 
Richardson (1930) 44 CLR 576; Russell v Mueller (1905) 25 NZLJ 256; R v Registrar-General 
(1905) 24 NZLR946; Lee Mong Kow v Registrar-General of Titles (1923) 32 BCR 148; Williams 
v Pauworth r19001 AC 563; Tolley & Co Ltd v Bvne (1902) 28 VLR 95; Finucane v Registrar of 
. . .  
~ i t l i s  l i 9 0 2 j ~ s ~ 7 5 .  
See also discussion in "The Compensation Provisions of the Act", The New Zealand Torrens 
System Centennial Essays, Hinde ed, p 143. 
4 [I9951 2 NZLR 189. 
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The Decision: 
In the District Court, Twaddle J held that, although Marshall had an 
indefeasible title under the Act, he had nonetheless sustained loss or 
damage within s. 172(a). The children of the estate had caused disruption 
on the land and the uncertainty of title had prevented him making full use 
of his legal ownership. Negligence was attributed to both the Registrar and 
to the administrator of the estate: the former for not having been alerted to 
the fact that the transmission and the transfer related to Maori land; the 
latter for not checking the Maori Land Court records, and not examining 
the old titles. Judgment was granted against the Registrar for 40% of the 
costs. 
The District Land Registrar appealed against the award. He contended 
that, as Marshall had an indefeasible title to the land, the title did not require 
confirmation by the Maori Land Court. 
In his dismissal of the appeal, Hammond J identified two essential 
issues: did s. 172(a) cover losses of this kind, and was the loss occasioned 
by the omission, mistake or misfeasance of the Registrar? 
Hammond J clearly identified the differing nature ofthe two subsections 
of s. 172, stating that, as s. 172(b) specifically dealt with the loss or 
deprivation of land, s. 172(a) must be regarded as applying to other kinds 
of loss as well. His Honour acknowledged the decision of Edwards J in 
Wells v Registrar-General of Lands5 and further pointed out that such an 
interpretation reflected the general philosophy of the statute. It was con- 
sidered inappropriate to regard any claim under s. 172(a) a "negligence 
claim"; rather, it should be a statutory claim to compensation within the 
terms of the legislation itself. The lack of uniformity in decisions concern- 
ing the interpretation of the statutory words "omission, mistake or misfea- 
sance", suggested to His Honour the breadth of application of s. 172(a). 
The words "omission" and "mistake" were held to take their natural 
meaning. As the issue in point was clearly an "omission", there was no 
necessity to deal with the somewhat murkier meaning of the word "mis- 
feasance". Attention was drawn to the word "through" which clearly 
indicated an element of causation. 
Did then, the omission of the Registrar result in a loss? Counsel for the 
appellant, referring to the decision of McGechan J in Housing Corporation 
of New Zealand v Maori T r ~ s t e e , ~  argued that the indefeasibility of 
Marshall's title made the application to the Maori Land Court "superflu- 
ous". The "loss" therefore was not compensatable under the statute as it 
was not caused by the District Land Registrar. While confirming the 
superiority of the Land Transfer Act over Maori Affairs legislation, Harn- 
mond J, adopting a narrower perspective, sought only to decide whether 
the Registrar had omitted to do something he ought lawfully to have done. 
The obligations owed by the District Land Registrar and the administrator 
had not been met. Marshall's loss had, in part at least, been caused by the 
Registrar's failure to both note that the land was clearly Maori land and 
give due effect to Regulation 16 of the Land Transfer Regulations 1966 
(SR 1966125). Loss had also been caused by the administrator's failure to 
5 (1909) 29 NZLR 101. 
6 [I9881 2 NZLR 662. 
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comply with s. 164 of the Act and Regulation 17 of the Re 
Honour emphasized his views with the following 
It is well-known to Registrars that Maori people, and the Maori Affairs Department make 
extensive use of the Maori Land Court records in considering loans, and other matters in 
relation to Maori. Both public and private reliance is an obvious and known factor in this 
particular situation. There is no policy reason I can discern ... to cause the Court to restrict 
liability. 
In short, it was held that s. 172(a) did cover loss of this kind, and that 
the loss was partially caused by an omission of the Registrar. Hammond 
J's well-reasoned judgment and careful observations identify important 
contemporary issues in this area of law. This paper analyses and comments 
on three: the problem of two systems of registration in New Zealand, the 
significance of contributory negligence in a claim for compensation, and 
the concept of insurance. 
Two Systems of Registration 
To any keen observer, New Zealand accommodates two systems of 
registration of interests in land - one embodied in the Land Transfer Act 
1952; the other in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. Hammond J 
confirmed that when the two systems conflict, the Land Transfer Act must 
take p r i~r i ty .~  
In short, on this sort of question of primacy, the Land Transfer Act trumps Maori Affairs 
legislation. At the end of the day, as a matter of high principle, that must be so : if there is 
any area of the law in which the absolute security is required - without any equivocation 
- it must be in the area of security of title to real property ... The Maori Land Court is an 
important institution in New Zealand. It is an institution to which many Maori in fact look 
before turning their attention to the Land Transfer Office. Maori rightly regard the Court 
as an important guardian of their interests. But ... there can be no equivocation on a matter 
of such importance as where paramountcy of title lies. To say that non-compliance with 
other reporting requirements can or might somehow affect indefeasibility of title is simply 
untenable ... 
While the important Maori Appellate Court decision (Re Pakiri R Block 
and Rahui Te Kuri Incorporation 23/3/93, MAC Case Stated 1/93) was 
acknowledged, Hammond J refused to allow the comments of that court 
to undermine the strength of an indefeasible title? There are now sugges- 
tions that the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 may have changed the view 
that provisions for notification in the Maori Land Court exist for adminis- 
7 [I9951 2 NZLR 189,200-1. 
s [I9951 2 NZLR 189 at 198-199. Hammond J confirmed McGechan J's decision in Housing 
Corporation of New Zealand v Maori Trustee [I9881 2 NZLR 662. It was held in this case that, 
on its registration at the Land Transfer Off~ce, aHousing Corporation mortgage became valid and 
enforceable against all parties, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 233 of the Maori Affairs Act 
1953. Section 233(1) of the 1953 Act provided: 
No alienation of Maori freehold land which is not by this Part of this Act required to be confirmed 
by the Court shall have any force or effect unless and until the instrument by which the alienation 
is effected has endorsed thereon a memorial that it has been produced to the Registrar and has been 
noted in the records of the Court. 
While confirming that Marshall did indeed have a water-tight indefeasible title, Hammond J 
considered the essential issue in the case to be narrower. 
9 The Maori Appellate Court stated at p 2, para 3 that: 
... since the decision in Housing Corporation of New Zealand v Maori Trustee [I9881 2 NZLR 
662, a feeling has arisen among some Judges that the Land Transfer Office has adopted a somewhat 
cavalier attitude towards Maori land and the protective mechanisms ofthe Maori Affairs Act 1953. 
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trative convenience but in no way affect indefeasibility of title.'' Section 
126 is a new provision in the 1993 Act. It provides: 
126. No registration without prior confirmation - The District Land Registrar shall not 
register any instrument affecting Maori land (other than an instrument not required to be 
confirmed or an order of the Court or of the Registrar) unless the instrument has been 
confirmed by the Court, or the Registrar of the Court has issued a certificate of confirmation 
in respect of the instrument, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Part VIII of this 
Act. 
The apparently indestructible indefeasible title may well be undermined. 
If the District Land Registrar registers a transfer without confirmation, s. 
81 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 could be used to correct the title. The 
mechanisms of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 seem to stretch well 
beyond the suggestion that "every reasonable effort, in the interests of 
Maori should be made to ensure that the quality of information in the Maori 
Land Court Registry is supported.ll 
Contributory Negligence 
Marshall's case has confirmed the availability of the defence of con- 
tributory negligence in compensation claims. Former relevant decisions 
occurred before negli ence became apportionable under the Contributory 
Negligence Act 1947f2 While nothing in the Contributory Negligence Act 
1947 appears to preclude its application to the compensation provisions of 
the Land Transfer Act 1952, judicial affirmation is reassuring. 
The availability of this defence is not uniform in Torrens jurisdictions. 
In New South Wales full compensation for the loss must be given. This is 
confirmed in the two decisions: Registrar-General v Behn13 and Northside 
Development Pty Ltd v Registrar-General. l4  In Victoria, no compensation 
is payable if the claimant, or his or her solicitor or agent, causes or 
substantially contributes to the loss by fraud, neglect or wilful default. For 
a claimant to be successful in a bid for compensation under s. 110 of the 
Transfer of Land Act 1958, he or she must prove that the loss was not 
caused by this type of fraud. Comment has been made on the consequent 
difficulties. l5 
The Queensland courts have, for many years, struggled with the issue 
of contributory negligence for compensation claims. In the new Land Title 
Act 1994, s. 174(l)(b) provides that a person is not entitled to compensa- 
tion for deprivation, loss or damage if that person, his or her agent, or an 
indemnified solicitor caused or substantially contributed to the depriva- 
tion, loss or damage by fraud, neglect or wilful default.I6 
The defence is available in New Zealand - it should therefore be used. 
lo  Obiter comment in Re Pakiri R Block and Rahui Te Kuri Incorporation 23/3/93, MLC, 1/93; and 
Brooker's LandLaw, para 14.4.03 and 14.7.0312. 
1 1  Comment by Hammond J: [I9951 2 NZLR 189 at 201. 
12 See, for example, Miller v Davy (1 889) 7 NZLR 5 15; Re Jackson 's Claim (1 890) 10 NZLR 148; 
and obiter in Russell v Regisear-General of Land (1906) 26 NZLR 1223. 
13  [I9801 1 NSWLR 589. 
14 [I9871 ACLR 513; (1987) 5 ACLC 642. 
15 Robin Edwards "Immediate Indefeasibility and Forgery: Is it what we really want?" Law Institute 
Journal, vol 67, No 8, August 1993. 
16 For prior research, see Queensland Law Reform Commission, Consolidation of Real Property Acts, 
Report No 40, March 1991. See also P Butt "A new era in Torrens title in Queensland- the Land 
Title Act 1994" (1994) ALJ 675. 
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The Concept of Insurance 
Prior to Marshall v Registrar-General ofland, the administration of our 
Land Transfer system has escaped accountability. Claims by the Registrar- 
General that "public confidence in the land titles system depends on the 
standards achieved in keeping the record" and that the officials who 
administer the Land Transfer Act have been "meticulous"17 indicate strin- 
gent control. Do they, however, reflect current business trends? One of the 
public policy reasons for the compensation provision is the concept of 
insurance; the other, efficiency in public administration. The correlation 
of both concepts is important and can be achieved through an effective risk 
management policy. Hammond J cites Mapp's simple theory:'' 
If the Registrar knows that an insurance fund is available and will be utilized on sound 
insurance principles, he can tailor protective requirements to meet only risks of sufficient 
frequency to justify them. 
Statistical analyses in various Torrens 'urisdictions suggest that Land 
Registry offices return substantial profits. rb 
In its 1989 Report,20 the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
addressed the issue. It referred to the findings of a management consultant 
who reviewed the operations of the assurance fund in Vi~toria:~' 
He regarded it as paradoxical that while most of the work in the Titles Office was directed 
towards maintaining the integrity of the Register Book and minimising claims against the 
assurance fund, recent statistics showed that the overwhelming proportion of successful 
claims resulted from errors in the processing system itself, and not from deficiencies in 
registered titles. The Office subjects documents to intense scrutiny at a high cost both to 
the office itself and to the users of the system. It was doubtful ... that these costs resulting 
from a system designed to protect the fund were greatly outweighed by the costs of meeting 
claims caused by deficiencies in the Register ... Mr Taeuber made the general observation 
that in striving for "administrative perfection" the Office was allocating resources to one 
aspiration when the resources could have been allocated to a more realistic, achievable 
objective, such as containing losses resulting from lost documents. 
Although the Register of Titles in Victoria disagreed with many of the 
consultant's observations, the Land Titles Office has progressively moved 
towards a risk management policy. It has abandoned many checking 
processes: for example, requisitions on withdrawal of lapsed caveats and 
checks on signatures and registrations of companies have been eliminated. 
Appropriate staff reductions have been made. The Law Commission 
suggested that many more administrative processes could be eliminated. 
1 7  "Forgery, Fraud and Frailty", B E Hayes (1988) 4 BCB 270. 
18 [I9951 2 NZLR 189 at 194, referring to Mapp, Torrens Elusive Title (1978) (Alberta Law Review 
Book Series) at p 70. 
19 Various Torrens jurisdictions have produced analytical evidence of claims made against the 
Assurance Fund. See, for example, New South Wales Law Reform Commission in Issues Paper 6 
(December 1989) "Torrens Title : Compensation for Loss" at p 5 for analysis of claims in New 
South Wales between 1977-1988, and p 6 for like analysis invictoria between 1981 and 1987. A 
similar studv was made in New Zealand for claims between 1981 and 1988 (1988) 4 BCB 270. 
Hammond .f, at p 196 of his judgment, suggests that the lack of case law for compensation claims 
indicates a pattern of settled claims. While this assumption appears to have been confirmed by 
counsel for the appellant, the writer queries it. 
20 New South Wales Law Reform Commission "Tomns Title: Compensation for Loss" Issues Paper, 
December 1989, IPC. 
21 Ibid, 35. 
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Hammond J commented that this "risk management" policy is practised 
"to a greater or lesser degree"22 in all Torrens jurisdictions. To what extent 
is it practised in New Zealand? Adherence to administrative perfection in 
this area is outdated. The introduction, in April 1995, of single-page Land 
Transfer forms for the facilitation of a computerized Land Transfer system, 
and indeed the computerization itself, should result in a considerable 
reduction in administrative checking procedures. The Land Transfer Of- 
fice has recently become part of the Department of Survey and Land 
Information. This transition period should provide an opportunity for a 
careful appraisal of present systems and staff numbers. 
2 :  McNicholl v Attorney ~ e n e r a l ~ ~  
The ~ a c t s : ~ ~  
A parcel of land was brought under the Land Transfer Act in 1935 pursuant 
to the Land Transfer (Compulsory Registration of Titles) Act 1924 and a title 
issued expressed to be "limited as to title and parcels". In 1958 a new title was 
issued for part ofthat land for which the limitation as to title had been removed 
though the limitation as to parcels remained. In 1965 that land was subdivided 
into eight separate lots with a residue remaining. 
In 1987 the residue was transferred to Mr McNicholl and new "balance 
title", CT 64N444, issued on request without the deposit of any new survey 
plan for that land. Through an error in the Land Transfer Office, the 
limitation as to parcels was not recorded on this title. The area on the title 
was expressed to be 1.38 12 hectares despite the fact that the memorandum 
of transfer into Mr McNicholl's name and the order to create a new CT 
both showed the area as 4550 m2. The difference was accounted for by the 
presence of a road. The actual road ran across the land shown in the title, 
though the former paper road ran where shown on the title to the west of 
the land. Clearly the issue of the "balance title" was done simply on the 
basis of the earlier part cancelled title and failed to take account of the then 
known position of the actual road. 
Between 1977 and 1990 Mr and Mrs McNicholl lived on a large property, 
on which was the matrimonial home, immediately to the west of the land 
shown on CT 64N444. In 1990 the couple separated and proceedings for the 
division of the matrimonial assets followed. It was proposed that as part of 
the settlement Mrs McNicholl, the plaintiff, should take the land with the 
matrimonial home and also the land in CT 64N444, the latter being needed 
for sale to produce the cash to reduce the mortgage on the former land. 
In January 199 1 Mrs McNicholl employed a valuer, Mr Brock, to value 
the land in CT 64N444. He did so on the area on the certificate of title, 
1.3812 hectares, despite the government valuation being on the area of 
4550 m2. His valuation was $120,000 and the government valuation 
$12,000. He did cany out a physical inspection of the land before making 
the valuation. Realising the discrepancy in area, Mr Brock pointed out in 
his report that the District Valuer was intending to revalue the land to 
reflect the "correct", ie greater, area. On 13 September 199 1 a consent order 
22 [I9951 2 NZLR 189 at 194. 
23 Unreported, Tompkins J, 31 July 1995, HC, Auckland, M1295194. 
24 The facts and a full comment on this case are detailed in a case note by the writer in (1995) 7 BCB 
119, 
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for the division of the matrimonial property, based in part on this informa- 
tion, was made in the Family Court. 
Later in 1991 the land in CT 64Al444 was surveyed and, according to 
the judgment,25 "it was then [Mrs McNicholl] discovered that the area was 
only 4550 m2." As such, the local authority would not consent to the 
erection of a house on the site. When the problem was pointed out to the 
Land Registry Office, an officer acknowledged that an omission had been 
made in not noting the title as "limited to parcels" and hence this claim for 
compensation. 
Subsequent negotiations with the local authority resulted in that body 
acquiring the land over which the road actually ran in exchange for the 
land covered by the paper road. 
A 1994 valuation of the land as at 199 1 based on the two differing areas 
showed a discrepancy of $100,000 for which this claim was then brought. 
The Decision: 
Tompkins J stated without discussion that the claim came within s. 
172(a). The Crown argued that the quantum of the claim was limited by s. 
179 of the Act, but Tompkins J held that a comparison of the wording of 
the section shows that s. 179 applies only to claims under s. 172(b) and 
that therefore the claim was to be assessed in accordance with ordinary 
common law principles. Taking all of the factors into account, His Honour 
made an award of $75,000 together with interest at 11 per cent from 13 
September 1991 and costs. 
The success of Mrs McNicholl's claim raises a number of issues. 
The parameters of the two sub-sections: 
Hammond J, in Marshall's case, analysed the differences between s. 
172(a) and s. 172(b) of the Land Transfer Act 1952. If s. 172(b) covered 
"land loss", s. 172(a) "must apply to other kinds of loss as His 
Honour's main concern was to ensure the breadth of the section - it should 
not apply only to deprivation of an estate or interest in land. As Marshall 
had clearly not been so deprived, s. 172(a) was plainly (and exclusively) 
applicable. There was no necessity to further consider the alternate nature 
of the two sub-sections. Mrs McNicholl's situation is more complex. She 
was claiming for loss resulting from the omission of the words "limited as 
to parcels" on Certificate of Title 64N444. Expressed differently, she was 
claiming for loss resulting from the incorrect belief that she had a guaran- 
teed title with an area of 1.38 12 hectares. Clearly, this could also constitute 
a claim under s. 172(b): she had been deprived of an estate or interest in 
land through "an error, omission or misdescription in [her] certificate of 
title". A new problem thus arises - are the subsections pure  alternate^?^' 
The occurrence of a compensation claim falling under two heads is not 
unknown. In New South Wales, Section 126(1) of the Real Property Act 
1900 is not dissimilar to our s. 172(b). Section 127 provides a separate 
cause of action for loss through departmental error or when no remedy is 
25 McNichoN v Attorney General, above note 23, at pS. 
26 [I9951 2 NZLR 189, 195. 
27 It could be argued that the word "or" between the two subsections suggests this - but see later 
comments. 
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available under s. 126. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
in its Issues Paper2' made the following comment: 
Section 127 duplicates some of the bases of claim in s 126, but in other respects is quite 
different. Unlike s 126, which requires plaintiffs to prove that they have been deprived of 
an estate or interest in land, s 127 requires only that plaintiffs have suffered loss or damage. 
In practice, however, the differences between ss 126 and 127 are not regarded as critical, 
and plaintiffs normally bring proceedings under both sections ... Due to ungainly drafting 
it is sometimes difficult to discern the separate functions of ss 126 and 127 ... 
The wording of s. 172 of the Land Transfer Act might easily be dubbed 
"ungainly". Strict adherence to one of two alternatives is limiting. Only 
the removal of the exclusivity of both parts of s. 172 will truly preserve 
"the wide scope for compensation advocated by Hammond 5".29 
The narrowing of Mrs McNicholl's claim to s. 172(a) had a significant 
effect on the eventual financial outcome. In the judgment, it was held, quite 
correctly, that s. 179 should only apply to claims made under s. 172 b . In 
this case therefore the limitations imposed by s. 179 did not apply.3 6' 
Tompkins J proceeded to assess the claim "on the normal basis for the 
assessment of darn age^".^' Citing Griffiths J in Registrar of Titles v 
Spencer,32 His Honour endeavoured to put Mrs McNicholl "in the same 
position, so far as money can do it, as if the wrongful act complained of 
had not been done".33 The claim was assessed at the time ofthe matrimonial 
settlement. Mrs McNicholl's part of the settlement included land suppos- 
edly worth $120,000 but, in reality, worth only $20,000; and the award of 
compensation was $75,000 plus interest. There is no discussion in the 
judgment of the New South Wales decision Registrar-General v Behn,34 
in which Mahoney J specifically commented on the decision in S p e n ~ e r : ~ ~  
I ... do not think that what was said in Spencer's case ... should be seen as limiting damages 
in all cases to the value of the land at the date when the  lai in tiff was de~rived of it. I do not 
mean by this that, in every case, damages under the sktutory count &e to be assessed by 
reference to the value of the land of which the plaintiff was deprived at the time of the 
judgment. Each case must be considered according to its own facts ... 
Mahoney J's comments seem particularly pertinent in Mrs McNicholl's 
situation. At the time ofthe hearing, as a result ofher subsequent agreement 
with the local authority, she was in the position she originally anticipated. 
The value of the land reflected the basis of the matrimonial settlement. If 
this discretionary approach had been adopted by Tompkins J, the outcome 
may have been very different.36 
2s IP 6, December 1989, 18-19. 
29 [1995]2NZLR189, 195. 
30 Section 179 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 provides: 
Measure of Damages -No person shall, as against the Crown, be entitled to recover any greater 
amount for compensation in respect ofthe loss or deprivation of any land, or of any estate or interest 
in land therein, than the value of that land, estate or interest at the time of that deprivation, together 
with the value of the messuages and tenements erected thereon and improvements made thereto 
(if any) prior to the time of that deprivation, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum to the 
date of 'udgment recovered. 
31 ~ c ~ i c k ~  v Attorney General, above note 23, at p 7. 
32 (1909)9CLR641. 
33 Ibid, p 645. 
34 [I9801 1 NSWLR 589. 
35 Ibid, p 597. 
36 AS indicated in (1995) 7 BCB 120, similar recommendations for a discretionary approach to the 
measure of compensation have been made by the New South Wales Law Reform commission in 
Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 6, 19951 
Contributory Negligence 
This case occurred within months of Hammond J's decision in Regis- 
trar-General ofLandv M a r ~ h a l l . ~ ~  Although Hammond J clearly endorsed 
the application of contributory negligence principles to compensation 
claims, counsel for the Crown in this latter case did not raise the defence. 
Mrs McNicholl appears to be at least partially responsible for the problems 
relating to the value of the land in CT 64Al444. For some years, she had 
lived close to that land, on which the existence of a road would have been 
unmistakable. One might also have expected her to have questioned the 
government valuation, which was based on an area of 4550 m2. Moreover, 
it is clear from her discussion with the valuer months before the matrimo- 
nial settlement that she was well aware of the problem. She decided 
nonetheless to proceed with the settlement. Should she have been held 
accountable? 
The two recent judgments on s. 172(a) of the Land Transfer Act 1952 
highlight uncertainties with respect to compensation for errors or omis- 
sions by the Registrar. However, the effect of s. 172(b) - claims for 
deprivation of an estate or interest in land - has, in New Zealand, long 
remained ~ n d e b a t e d . ~ ~  The lack of litigation may suggest prior settlement 
of claims. It may also suggest a failure to recognise this essential provision. 
A study of the Torrens jurisdictions shows that many registered owners 
have lost their titles as a result of indefeasibility, but few associated 
compensatory claims have ever succeeded. The access of such claims has 
been likened to the process of "getting blood out of a stone".39 Some of the 
difficulties and injustices are uniform; others are unique. 
In New South Wales, the combined effect of ss 126 and 127 of the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) forces a claimant against the fund to pursue the 
wrongdoer first before bringing an action against the Registrar General. 
The latter action may also be brought if the claimant cannot fully recover 
the amount of the loss from the wrongdoer. The Registrar General can only 
exercise a right of subrogation with respect to moneys recovered under s. 
126; ie when the person liable cannot be found or is insolvent or bankrupt.40 
As in New Zealand, a claimant may obtain compensation for de rivation 
resulting from fraud, including the fraud of a solicitor or agent. 4!'
its paper "Torrens Title: Compensation for Loss" (IP 6, December 1989) and by the Alberta Law 
Reform Commission in Report No 69 "Proposals for a Land Recording and Registration Act for 
Alberta". In the former paper, it was clearly stated that by placing limitations on indemnity, the 
. .  - 
whole principle of insurance is wrongly excluded. 
37 [I9951 2 NZLR 189. 
3s For a discussion on the ambit of this subsection, see Hinde, McMorland & Sim Land Law (vol i, 
1978; vol ii, 1979) Buttenvorths, paras 2.113 -2.127; Sim "The Compensation Provisions of the 
Act" (1 97 1) The New Zealand Torrens Svstem Centennial Essays PP 138-1 57; Brookers LandLaw 
. .- 
1-501'. ' 
39 "Forgeries - Indefeasibility of Title" Solicitors' Liability Committee, Law Institute Journal 1990, 
474 
J2.J. 
40 See s. 13 1 Real Property Act 1900; Northside Developments Pty Lid v Registrar-General (1987) 
ACLR 5 13; (1987) 5 ACLC 642. 
41 This provision has in recent years been the subject of considerable debate. The phrase "in 
consequence of f raud  was given an extremely narrow interpretation in the case Armour v Penrith 
Projects Pty Ltd [I9791 1 NSWLR 98. In the Northside case, it was held that fraud need not be 
confined to the mechanics of registration. Support for this view was gained fiom Parker v 
Registrar-General [I9771 1 NSWLR 22 and Behn v Registrar-General [I9791 2 NSWLR 46; 
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In Victoria, s. 1 10 ofthe Transfer ofLandAct 1958 allows compensation 
payments to any person who has suffered loss or damage, within eight 
specified categories. Section 1 1 1 of that Act provides for direct application 
to the Registrar who may admit the claim and make the appropriate 
payment. If the application is refused, it is still possible to commence an 
action. If an action is commenced, s. 1 10 then enables the plaintiff to name 
the Registrar General as nominal defendant without first having to take 
proceedings against the wrongdoer. The Registrar is entitled to join in any 
other person as a co-defendant.42 
The category of fraud as a means for recovery from the assurance fund 
is not specifically provided for in s. 110. It seems clear that some of the 
grounds for lodging a claim should allow for compensation, but expressly 
excluded from compensation are any cases in which the claimants or their 
solicitors or agents have substantially contributed to the loss by fraud. For 
a claimant to be successful in a bid for compensation, he or she must prove 
that the loss was not caused by this type of fraud. The cases Eade v 
Vogiazo oulos & and Vassos & Anor v State Bank of South Australia 63 & Anor provide recent judicial comment. In Chasjild Pty Ltd v tar ant^:^ 
Gray J's decision in favour of deferred indefeasibility casts an uncertain 
light on the Victorian compensation provisions. Under the principle of 
deferred indefeasibility a loss, apparently caused to a mortgagee by having 
a forged mortgage removed from the Register, may not be capable of 
supporting a successful claim. 
In Queensland, the Court's interpretation of fraud in the context of ss 
126- 129 and s. 13 5 of the now out-dated Real Property Act 1861 -1 990 has 
until recently been so narrow that any right of recovery turned "on the 
quixotic nature of the type of fraud perpetrated, rather than on any discern- 
ible rational p r in~ ip le" .~~  In Beardsley v Registrar of Titles47 the very 
narrow interpretation of the words "a person who derived benefit by such 
fraud" seemed unduly harsh. However, in The Registrar of Titles v Igarashi 
& the Court ofAppeal ofthe Supreme Court of Queensland has ruled 
that, in s. 126, the phrase "the person who derived benefit by such fraud" 
must not be limited in its operation to a person who becomes registered by 
such fraud. To so limit would be inconsistent with the evident purpose of 
both ss 126 and 127. 
While some Australian states struggle against "compensation schemes 
[which] are so guarded by statutory procedural hurdles which a claimant 
must surmount, and are so closely defended by the state that their very 
[I9801 1 NSWLR 589; (1981) 35 ALR 633. Inthe High CourtdecisionSaade vRegistrar-General 
(1993) 118 ALR 219, a liberal interpretation was adopted in order to find in favour of the person 
deprived. For a discussion on this decision, see P Mendelow "Fraudulent Deprivation and the 
Torrens Assurance Fund: Saade v Registrar-General (1993) 118 ALR 219, (1994) 2 APLJ 279. 
42 D J Whalan considers this approach superior to the approach in some other Torrens jurisdictions 
(for example, New South Wales and Queensland) where action must be first brought against the 
wrongdoer. It not only accords more with the principle of insurance, but also lessens the duty of 
care needed to ensure that the correct defendant is sued. See D J Whalan, The Torrens System in 
Ausfralia, Law Book Com any, Sydney, 1982. 
43 (1993) V ConvR 54-458; 8993) ANZ ConvR 129. 
44 (1992) V ConvR 54-443: (1993) ANZ ConvR 39. 
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existence is something of a mockery",49 our comparative legislation suffers 
fewer handicaps. Innocent New Zealand victims should find the fbnd 
reasonably accessible. The essential question is - do they? 
Within the past five years, there have been several reported cases inNew 
Zealand on s. 62, s. 182 and s. 183 of the Land Transfer Act 1952.j0 In all, 
the principle of immediate indefeasibility has been reviewed and, without 
exception, ~onfirmed.~'  This paper raises the possibility that some of these 
victims, unaware of their rights, have been left to "lick their wounds" and 
ponder the justice of our system. It is not known if deprived parties have 
followed up decisions by claiming payments from the compensation fund. 
Information on possible settlements cannot be obtained, on the basis that 
its provision may breach the Privacy Act. If, however, settlements have 
not been made, our practice of pure Torrens law is flawed. A comparative 
analysis of two recent cases, one in Victoria and one in New Zealand, 
illustrates the problem. The two cases are undeniably similar in fact. 
Compensation was awarded in the former. Was it awarded in the latter? 
Victoria: Eade v Vogiazopoulos & 
In June 1988, Mr Vogiazopoulos negotiated the purchase of a butcher's 
business. A solicitor (Mr Stergiou) was employed to act for him and 
purportedly for his wife. A finance broker (Mr Shearer) was also engaged. 
Preliminary negotiations failed and the transaction faltered. But by mid- 
July 1988 it was revived and proceeded quickly. Mr Shearer arranged a 
loan of $1 80,000 from a Mr Eade, to be secured by a first mortgage over 
the Vogiazopoulos home. Shortly after, the contract for the purchase of the 
business was completed. Mr Vogiazopoulos did not operate the business 
successfully; Mrs Vogiazopoulos took no part in it. The mortgage fell into 
arrears, and, after one variation Mr Eade eventually commenced proceed- 
ings. 
In the first proceeding, Eade sought orders for possession of the family 
home. Judgment was entered against Mr Vogiazopoulos, but Mrs Vogia- 
zopoulos defended the proceedings claiming that she did not sign the 
mortgage or the variation. She thus submitted that by reasons ofthe forgery 
the forged mortgage (which had been registered) was null and void. 
Alternatively, she claimed that she was entitled to an in personam claim. 
She alleged breach of duty of care against her solicitor owed to her as a 
result of his purporting to act for her as a solicitor in relation to the mortgage 
and the purchase. She had signed a statutory declaration as to non-sale prior 
to the loan transaction. She also sought compensation from the Registrar 
49 Registrar-General of Land v Marshall [I9951 2 NZLR 189, 195. Hamrnond J made reference to 
the following criticisms on the topic - Simpson, Land Law andRegistration (1976), pp 179-183; 
Mapp, at p 69; Sim "The Compensation Provisions of the Act" in Hinde, The New Zealand Torrens 
System Centennial Essays (1971), pp 138-157; McGillivray "Compensation Provisions in Torrens 
Statutes: The Existing Structure and Proposals for Change" (1993) 67 ALJ 904. 
so See, for example, Morrison v Bank of New Zealand [I9911 3 NZLR 291; Cricklewood Holdings 
Ltdv C VQuigley & SonsNominees Ltd [I9921 1 NZLR463; Jessett Properties Ltdv UDC Finance 
Ltd [I9921 1 NZLR 138; Dungey v McCallum [I9931 3 NZLR 551; Disher v Farnworfh [I9931 3 
NZLR 390 (CA). - ~ - 
~ ,---, 
sl  The recent upheavals in Australia concerning immediate and deferred indefeasibility have not been 
mirrored in New Zealand. For a full discussion of these cases, see E Toomey: "Fraud and Forgery 
in the 1990s: Can our Adherence to Frazer and Walker Survive the Strain?" (1995) 5 Canta. L.R. 
No 3. 
52 (1993) V ConvR 54-458; ANZ ConvR 129. 
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of Titles. Eade contended that if the signature was not that of Mrs Vogia- 
zopoulos, it was placed on the documents by her husband as agent. The 
question of estoppel was also raised. With respect to the compensation 
claim, the Registrar argued that neglect had substantially contributed to 
her loss. 
The allegation of forgery led to further proceedings. 
It was held, inter alia, that Mr Eade was entitled to enforce the mortgage 
against Mrs Vogiazopoulos. Evidence concluded that the signature of Mrs 
Vogiazopoulos had been forged. The validity of the mortgage could only 
be challenged if there was proof of fraud on the part of Mr Eade or his 
agent. No evidence suggested this; thus, the mortgage could stand. 
Mrs Vogiazopoulos claimed indemnity from the Registrar of Titles 
under s. 1 10 of the Transfer of Land Act 195 8. 
Smith J held that though the registration of the mortgage could not be 
challenged, it did however cause her loss and damage. The Act prevented 
her having the mortgage set aside and the register rectified even though 
the mortgage was forged. Her fee simple in the land was thus encumbered. 
It was further held that, if she had been negligent in her failure to read the 
statutory declaration, this act was not the sole cause or the substantial cause 
of her loss. 
Mrs Vogiazopoulos was thus entitled to compensation for the loss 
suffered as a result of the registration of the mortgage to Mr Eade. 
en 
New Zealand: Morrison v Bank of New ~ea land '  
Mr and Mrs Morrison were joint owners of a property in Browns Bay. 
Mr Morrison is described in the evidence as "a businessman with a number 
of different interests; such things as thoroughbred horse racing and breed- 
ing, goat farming and kiwifruit ... [and had] a substantial portfolio of shares 
and a number of different proper tie^".^^ 
The Bank of New Zealand, with whom Mr Morrison had a number of 
different transactions relating to his various business activities, granted a 
mortgage over the Browns Bay property, apparently signed by both hus- 
band and wife and securing their joint and several liability. Mrs Morrison 
denied ever signing this, and the inference was drawn that her husband 
forged her signature. While it is not as clear as in Eade that the monies 
were intended to be used for purposes beyond the financing of the home, 
such further use can be deduced from the evidence. Significance can also 
be given to the remark by the solicitor who "witnessed" the signatures "that 
he was very conscious of the problems that could be created, particularly 
between a husband and wife when a mortgage of this nature which could 
be drawn on by the husband was entered into in relation to a family 
home".55 
The marriage subsequently came to an end. Part of the settlement of 
matrimonial property included the sale of the Browns Bay property. Mrs 
Morrison claimed that it was only then that she became aware of the 
mortgage to the Bank of New Zealand. The property was sold, a first 
mortgage to a nominee company was paid off, and other expenses were 
53 [1991] 3 NZLR291 
54 Ibid, 292. 
55 Ibid, 293. 
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met. The bank made claim to the remaining $220,000. Mrs Morrison made 
the following claims: that the mortgage was void or otherwise invalid on 
the grounds that her signatures to the mortgage and the overdraft facilities 
were forgeries; alternatively that she was entitled to half of the balance 
under the joint ownership of the property; or alternatively that the defen- 
dant bank was in breach of a duty of care owed to her. 
The defendant, relying on s. 62 and s. 183 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 
and the decision in Frazer v Walker56 submitted that the bank was entitled 
to complete protection because the mortgage, although forged, had been 
registered. Counsel for the plaintiff conceded the validity of the mortgage 
on this ground, but further argued, unsuccessfully, that the words of the 
mortgage should be construed having in mind the course of dealings 
between the parties, and that the bank was in breach of a duty of care. 
Hillyer J's decision clearly confirmed the principle of immediate indefea- 
sibility. 
Mrs Morrison's position bears undeniable similarity to that of Mrs Eade. 
Mrs Eade received monetary compensation for her deprivation. The ques- 
tion remains: did Mrs Morrison receive similar compensation through a 
settled claim, or did she remain unaware of her rights? 
Further Potential Claims Fo otten? 
The Renshaw Edwards De 7 acle and Others 
The risin incidence of fraud and forgery in mortgage transactions is 
undeniable! The illegal activities of a few practitioners in the country 
have seriously undermined public confidence in the legal profession. Not 
least among these were schemes devised by Lower Hutt partners Renshaw 
and Edwards. Innocent clients were left feeling angered and cheated. The 
Law Society was immediately targeted, and, in turn, the gross inadequacy 
of the fidelity fund resulted in obligatory "contributions" from all practis- 
ing principals in the country. While the debate concerning payment of the 
individual contributions of $10,000 by instalment continues, some of the 
victims still await full reparation. The Law Society's unquestioned as- 
sumption of liability is debatable. In the "scramble" to find an amount 
exceeding $30 million, no suggestion appears to have ever been made that 
the State may be liable for some of the deficit. One of the first basic 
investigations which should have been undertaken was to discover whether 
any of the many forgeries had culminated in registration. If any had, the 
answer is simple - under the Torrens guarantee of title, the State must be 
accountable. Instead, clients of the Lower Hutt firm have been trapped in 
arguments among solicitors as to whether the banks or the Law Society 
should shoulder the responsibility. No one appears to have targeted the 
State. The supposed simplicity of our Torrens system of registration may 
well have failed these people. Heed should thus be taken. 
56 [I9671 1 All ER 649. 
57 Practitioners are today being encouraged to exercise all necessary precautions. See "Practice 
Pointer - Avoiding Forgery in Mortgage Transactions" (1995) ANZ ConvR 147. 
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Compensation provisions in any Torrens statute must adequately reflect 
a genuine "insurance" objective. If this objective cannot be met, reform 
committees have suggested radical alternatives: the complete abolition of 
the scheme, the use by the State of the services of private insurance 
companies, or the introduction of private title insurance, be it optional or 
c o m p u l ~ o r y . ~ ~  Such sweeping reforms are unnecessary; more moderate 
oneswould, however, enhance the system. 
In New Zealand, the Land Transfer Act 1952 provides reasonably 
accessible and, in most cases, adequate State compensation. It is imperative 
that the empowering provisions are both recognized and used fairly. In any 
claims for loss other than land loss, the Courts must now carefully redefine 
the limits of s. 172(a). Greater discretion may provide necessary flexibility. 
The ~ossible disregard - or oblivion - of s. 172(b) is critical. Torrens' 
inten'tion was clearythe principle of indefeasibility'of title must be accom- 
panied by the availability of compensation for those who, through the 
operation of the Act, are barred from recovering their land. Partial use only 
of the system results in unacceptable injustices. 
58 See, for example, New South Wales Law Reform Commission "Torrens Title: Compensation for 
Loss" Issues Paper, December 1989, 1 PC. 
